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FOR THE LOVE OF CONTRACT 
Zvi H. Triger* 
MARTHA M. ERTMAN, LOVE’S PROMISES: HOW FORMAL AND INFORMAL 
CONTRACTS SHAPE ALL KINDS OF FAMILIES (BEACON PRESS 2015). PP. 
280. HARDCOVER $ 26.95. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Martha Ertman’s new book, Love’s Promises: How Formal and Informal Contracts 
Shape All Kinds of Families, explores the role of contracts within the family.1 It shows 
that contracts shape today’s families and argues that family law should acknowledge that 
and recognize such contracts. This review essay addresses the dramatic paradigm shifts 
that have been occurring in contract law and family law in the last decades as a response 
to technological developments and to people’s resourcefulness, which enable them to 
reimagine the family and create new forms of families. It presents and analyzes those shifts 
within their historical and socio-legal contexts. 
Part II of this essay presents the book’s terminology, and its main arguments. Dis-
tinguishing between plan A and plan B families, and between contracts and deals, Ertman 
urges readers—whether members of plan B families, lawyers, judges, policymakers or 
others—to reimagine family law and redesign it so that it better protects families and their 
members. 
Part III discusses  Ertman’s use of contracts within families against the backdrop of 
classical contract theory and its aversion to all things domestic. It explores the notion that 
housework has been considered, in Western thought, as a gift, and that love and contracts 
have been construed as mutually exclusive. 
Part IV argues that Ertman’s book should encourage us to think of Families’ Laws 
instead of Family Law, because there is no such thing as a single family model. The law 
should acknowledge the diversity of family models instead of tailoring itself to a single 
“Reasonable Family” model, as it has been doing since its early days.  
                                                 
*  Associate Professor of Law, The Haim Striks School of Law, The College of Management, Rishon Le Zion, 
Israel. I am grateful to Linda McClain for her insightful comments and suggestions. 
 1. MARTHA M. ERTMAN, LOVE’S PROMISES: HOW FORMAL AND INFORMAL CONTRACTS SHAPE ALL KINDS 
OF FAMILIES (2015). 
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Part V discusses the book’s methodology, and in particular its use of memoir and 
more traditional academic scholarship, and assesses its unique contribution. 
 
II. RECOGNIZING PLAN B FAMILIES: THE BOOK’S MAIN THEMES AND 
ARGUMENTS 
Love’s Promises focuses on what Ertman calls “Plan B families,”2 by contrast to 
“Plan A families,” that is the more traditional (and common) family, comprised of a mother 
and a father who are married to each other, and children that are genetically related to both 
of them. The term “Plan B families,” Ertman writes, “covers a wide variety of uncommon 
families, from repro tech [assisted reproductive technology] and adoption to cohabita-
tion.”3 Under this umbrella she includes same-sex couples (whether married or not), single 
parents, and families with more than two parents (like Ertman’s own family). The new 
language that this book suggests—Plan A/Plan B—is designed 
 
to help us think about uncommon families as exceptions to the gen-
eral rule instead of unnatural or inferior. “Plan A” is what’s common: more 
than nine out of ten kids are raised by their genetic parents, marriage is the 
most common family form, and most people are straight. But “common” is 
not the same as better. When someone veers toward the road less traveled, 
I call it “Plan B.”4 
 
Another key distinction this book utilizes is the one between contracts, which are 
agreements that courts enforce, and deals, which are agreements that are binding, but are 
legally unenforceable.5 Deals are what social relations are based upon on an everyday 
basis, but they are “just too small or vague to bring before a judge when they are 
breached[,]”6 and people do not expect to sue or be sued over breaches related to deals. “I 
pay the bills and you do the grocery shopping”7 is an example of an everyday deal between 
partners, roommates, or spouses. But we also make deals with friends (we share class notes 
if one of us is sick and cannot make it to class), and see them as binding, although not 
legally. That means if my classmate refuses to share her contracts notes with me from the 
class I had missed because I was lying sick in bed that day, despite our pact to cover for 
each other when we cannot come to class, I will not sue her (unless I am completely devoid 
of any social skills), but will consider myself exempt from sharing my own notes if she 
ever has to miss class. This is how deals work—the enforcement mechanism is social, not 
legal. Social norms such as mutuality and trust, rather than the law, make deals meaningful 
and binding. 
                                                 
 2. Id. at xiv. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at xii-xiii. 
 6. ERTMAN, supra note 1, at xiii. 
 7. Id. 
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The main argument of the book is that families of all types are shaped by both con-
tracts and deals, that contracts help create and maintain families, and that they are espe-
cially important for Plan B families.8 As Ertman writes, “[c]ontracts and deals allowed me 
to become one of three parents—all gay—raising a beloved boy named Walter.”9 
Moreover, contracts, if properly thought out and drafted, can also help in the unfor-
tunate situations of break ups, and assist the parties in avoiding damaging and acrimonious 
legal disputes. Ertman calls those clauses for rainy days “jerk insurance” clauses.10 They 
are known also as “Ulysses contracts” among behavioral economists.11 As Ertman ex-
plains, “a Ulysses contract strikes a deal between your present self and your future self, 
binding your future self not to do something stupid or self-destructive.”12 Similarly, a “jerk 
insurance” clause, such as an inconvenient and costly choice of law clause in the contract, 
makes it so cumbersome to litigate conflicts that the parties will be likely to choose a more 
collaborative way to resolve any issues that arise between them.13 
This leads to the other important theme explored in the book: the connection between 
contracts and love, which will be discussed in Part II of this essay. Ertman’s argument 
joins a long strand of feminist scholarship of contract law that has rejected the classical 
view of contracts and love as mutually exclusive.14 As I mentioned above, Ertman shows 
how contracts can secure love and be the product of love (the “jerk insurance” clause being 
one of the means to remind the fighting parties of the love that leads them to sign the 
contract and make the deals in the first place).15 
There are two aspects of the family that are explored in the book, and it is organized 
around them: Part I (chapters 2-5) explores Plan B parenthood, and Part II (chapters 6-9) 
discusses Plan B partnership. Both parts show how diverse families are (in Ertman’s own 
words, “love comes in different packages”),16 and therefore how important it is to release 
family law from its fixation on one model, namely the marital heterosexual model, or the 
Plan A model. Family law is increasingly recognizing that,17 but it has much more to offer 
in terms of accommodating and promoting Plan B families. The book’s goal is, among 
other things, to unleash law’s full potential in this regard. 
Plan B parenthood is achieved either by technological (reproductive technologies) 
or legal (adoption) means. Both ways are alternatives to the sexual relations between hus-
band and wife, which create Plan A parenthood. Plan B parenthood is varied: from heter-
osexual couples who cannot conceive, to LGBT and single women who need gamete do-
nations, and gay men who also need gestational surrogacy in order to become fathers. All 
these forms require contracts: between the intended parents (if they are more than one); 
                                                 
 8. Id. at xi-xii. 
 9. Id. at xv. 
 10. Id. at 167. 
 11. ERTMAN, supra note 1, at 167. 
 12. Id. See also IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS 15 (2010). 
 13. ERTMAN, supra note 1, at 167. 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. ERTMAN, supra note 1, at 167. 
 16. Id. at 109. 
 17. Id. 
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between the intended parents and healthcare providers; between the intended parents and 
the egg or sperm donors (or egg/sperm bank), etc. Contracts between birth and adoptive 
parents, and their enforceability, are also extremely sensitive and complex, and  are dis-
cussed in chapters 4 and 5. Of particular interest is the discussion of the evolution in the 
enforceability of post-adoption contact agreements (PACAs).18 PACAs are an exception 
to the general rule that “[a]doption completely severs the relationship between birth par-
ents and the child.”19 They can create open adoptions, in which the birth parents stay in 
touch with their child to varying degrees.20 
Part II of the book, which discusses Plan B partnership, is divided into two sections 
as well; the first explores cohabitation and the second looks at marital agreements. The 
cohabitation chapters (chapters 6 and 7) discuss the role of contracts between unmarried 
couples, and present a nuanced and balanced picture of the historical, social, and legal 
background of the related issues. It shows the vulnerability of the financially weaker part-
ner within a life partnership that is viewed as inferior compared to marriage21 and dis-
cusses various way in which it can be remedied. 
Similarly, the marriage chapters (chapters 8 and 9) discuss the importance of con-
tracts within the context of what is seemingly a Plan A partnership, but show how marriage 
has become much more diverse than we usually think it is—due to the gradual growing 
recognition in same-sex marriages, culminating in the repeal of Section 3 of the Defense 
of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 201322 and the Court’s decision (issued about a month after 
the publication of Love’s Promises), recognizing same-sex couples’ fundamental right to 
marry as stemming from both the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.23 
Ertman weaves her personal story throughout both parts of the book. As I discuss in 
Part VI, the personal stories are, to my mind, an important methodological choice. They 
serve both to humanize the issues and to show how concrete the issues discussed through-
out the book are. The personal stories, just like the cases discussed in the book, demon-
strate how these issues pertain crucially to the lives of actual people—women, men, and 
children—and are not mere theoretical concerns. Human creativity concerning familial 
attachments was not followed closely enough by legal creativity, and while the law, on 
both the state and federal level, is attempting to keep up with social innovations, it does 
not do enough. The personal narrative effectively demonstrates how it can do more and 
what it should stop doing. 
In the next part, I turn to exploring some of those themes and offer an assessment of 
the book’s unique contribution to the scholarship on these issues. 
                                                 
 18. Id. at 88. 
 19. Id. at 89. 
 20. ERTMAN, supra note 1, at 88-89. Ertman discusses the enforceability of PACAs, and shows how more 
and more states view them now as binding contracts and not as mere deals, with about half of the states enforcing 
them as of 2013. Id. 
 21. For a recent discussion of marital status discrimination, see generally Courtney G. Joslin, Marital Status 
Discrimination 2.0, 95 B.U. L. REV. 805 (2015). 
 22. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675  (2013). 
 23. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015). 
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III. CLASSIC CONTRACT THEORY, LOVE, AND THE FAMILY: THE GIFT 
ECONOMY AND ITS BIASES 
A. The Gift Economy within the Family 
In the late 1800s, Nancy Miller was desperately struggling to make ends meet. Her 
husband, Robert, “improperly spending money upon other women,”24 had left her with no 
other choice but to have him sign a written agreement to “provide for the necessary ex-
penses of the family” and in addition pay her $16.66 per month for her own personal ex-
penses.25 The agreement also included non-monetary promises. The Millers agreed “to 
live together as husband and wife and observe faithfully the marriage relation, and each to 
live virtuously with the other,”26 and “to refrain from scolding, fault-finding and anger in 
so far as relates to the future, and to use every means within their power to promote peace 
and harmony, and that each shall behave respectfully, and fairly treat each other.”27 Nancy 
promised to “keep her home and family in a comfortable and reasonably good condi-
tion.”28 
Robert failed to keep his contractual obligations, forcing Nancy to petition the court 
asking it to enforce the contract that she and Robert had signed. The Court deemed the 
contract between Nancy and Robert unenforceable for lack of consideration and for being 
against public policy.29 Under classic contract theory, a promise is not binding unless the 
promisee gave consideration in return for the promise,30 and housework is viewed as a 
gift, having no economic value,31  therefore, it cannot be proper consideration. Moreover, 
courts have deemed housework as part of the wife’s legal duties, and thus, not as some-
thing that she could give in exchange for the husband’s financial support.32 A wife’s 
“promise to observe marital duties”33 is not a proper consideration for a husband’s promise 
to support her, and therefore the agreement between Mr. and Mrs. Miller is unenforcea-
ble.34 This ruling reflected a well-established doctrine in many common law jurisdictions 
according to which contracts entered into between spouses are unenforceable.35 
                                                 
 24. Miller v. Miller, 78 Iowa 177, 179 (1889). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 178. 
 28. Id. at 178–79. 
 29. ERTMAN, supra note 1, at 120. 
 30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1979). An important exception to the consideration re-
quirement is the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Under this doctrine, a promise will be binding and enforceable 
despite lack of consideration if the promisee relied on it and changed his or her position based on the promise to 
his or her detriment. Id. at § 90. For a critical discussion, see generally Orit Gan, Promissory Estoppel: A Call 
for a More Inclusive Contract Law, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 47 (2013). 
 31. ERTMAN, supra note 1, at 120. 
 32. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 78 Iowa 177, 181-82 (1889). 
 33. Id. at 182. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., Balfour v. Balfour, (1919) 2 K.B. 571 (C.A.) (Eng.) (a British case ruling that contracts between 
husband and wife are not legally binding and therefore unenforceable). For an interesting discussion on the ten-
sion between family autonomy and state intervention (and responsibility), see LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE 
OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 15-49 (2006). 
5
Triger: For the Love of Contract
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2015
TRIGER_3.13.16 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/13/16  11:15 PM 
412 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:407 
 
B. Love and Contracts: A (Surprising) Match Made in Heaven 
Contract law, according to this doctrine, is foreign to family relations and to love.36 
The underlying rationale is Western political thought’s view of love as something that can 
exist only in the absence of law, rights, and contracts.37 “Love,” according to this notion, 
“is open-ended and generous . . . while contracts are selfish, cold, and calculating.”38 
Feminist critique beginning in the 1970s has called attention to the various fallacies 
of this doctrine.39 It has pointed out the prevalent cultural notion of the family as a 
“women’s issue” and therefore as antagonistic to the realm of contract, which has been 
culturally encoded as a “men’s issue.” Classic contract theory envisioned transactions be-
tween men (i.e., it envisioned contracts happening in the public sphere), whereas the fam-
ily and all that is going on within it was part of the private sphere.40 Indeed, under the 
common law doctrine of coverture, married women could not own property, sign contracts 
or do other legal actions without their husbands’ consent and approval.41 According to this 
notion, dealings within the family had to be motivated by love and derived from it, and not 
motivated by enforceable contractual obligations. This was, of course, a one-sided view 
of family life, because the husbands’ work (outside of the home) had economic value, 
while the wives were expected to give the gifts of caring, cleaning, and all the other home-
making chores. To sum, the love affair with contracts has been reserved under classic con-
tract theory to men. In this sense, it was indeed a one-sided love affair. 
Feminist critics of this one-sidedness, that treats men’s contribution to the family 
household as having economic value while women’s contribution, like love, has no price 
(literally), have shown how the exclusion of contract (and law) from the family served 
men’s interests.42 For example, Susan Moller Okin argued that the notion of unenforcea-
bility of spousal agreements magnified the vulnerability of women within the family and 
                                                 
 36. SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 121 (1989). 
 37. Id. at 32. 
 38. ERTMAN, supra note 1, at xi. 
 39. See, e.g., LENORE J WEIZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES, LOVERS, AND THE LAW (1981); 
Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 
(1983); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L. REV. 997 (1985); 
CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); Mary Joe Frug, Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine: A Post-
modern Feminist Analysis of Contract Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1029 (1992); JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 129-36 
(2011); see, e.g., Linda McClain, “Atomistic Man” Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurispru-
dence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171 (1992) (arguing that feminist critique of liberalism and its stance on, among other 
things, the family, is based on a caricatured version of liberalism in general, and of the “Atomistic Man” concept 
in particular). 
 40. See ERTMAN, supra note 1, at 98, 156; OKIN, supra note 36, at 30. 
 41. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Home As Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ 
Household Labor, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1850-80 (1994); GAIL COLLINS, WHEN EVERYTHING CHANGED: THE 
AMAZING JOURNEY OF AMERICAN WOMEN FROM 1960 TO THE PRESENT 250 (2009) (discussing that in some 
states, as late as the 1970s, married women could not get a credit card or open a bank account without their 
husbands’ signature, even if the women were the breadwinners). 
 42. See, e.g., Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women’s Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
81 (1997); Katharine B. Silbaugh, Gender and Nonfinancial Matters in the ALI Principles of the Law of Family 
Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 203, 205 (2001). 
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serves the interests of men.43 Contracts and legal commitments, in this view, not only will 
not poison marital relationships but will promote and ensure more justice and equality for 
women.44 
Ertman’s analysis, which distinguishes between contracts (binding and enforceable) 
and deals (binding but unenforceable) within the family (and between friends), helps us 
rethink and reimagine the family economy and treat more seriously some obligations 
which the traditional doctrine views as non-binding promises.45 Labeling an agreement as 
a deal rather than a contract does not necessarily mean that it is economically worthless. 
Moreover, in the context of the family, where “the common swap of financial support for 
homemaking”46 takes place on a daily basis, one cannot view one’s own part of an agree-
ment as contract, while proclaiming the other’s a mere deal. Ertman calls this swap a “pair-
bond exchange.”47 If a husband contracts out of his duty to share the marital property, 
argues Ertman, then the law should treat him as though he gave up his right to treat his 
wife’s homemaking as a gift, and compensate her accordingly.48 It seems that Ertman 
suggests that any one-sided invocation of a contract-deal relationship should be presumed 
to be made in bad faith. This is a true paradigm shift because the view of a husband’s 
contribution as a contract and the wife’s homemaking as a deal-derived gift is still preva-
lent in many jurisdictions.49 
Ertman’s call to respect the pair-bond exchange, and cancel the hierarchical relation-
ships between contracts and deals resonates with Carol Gilligan’s call to abandon the cul-
tural hierarchy that puts the ethic of justice, culturally encoded as masculine, on top and 
belittles the ethic of care, culturally encoded as feminine.50 Both ethics are essential for 
human relationships,51 and in the same vein, both contributions to family life—income 
and housework—are essential for families. Families cannot do without having both mon-
etary income and housework. The two reflect joint effort and investment in the family.52 
The hierarchy between contract (binding, enforceable, serving an ethic of justice) 
and deals (binding but unenforceable, derived from the feminine—and therefore inferior 
in a patriarchal society—ethic of care) serves men. As we saw in the Miller case, husbands 
who promised to pay their wives for their work at home could easily avoid enforcement 
of their promises by arguing that a husband and a wife cannot, by definition, enter a legally 
binding promise with each other. 
In the same vein, Patricia Williams has powerfully demonstrated how important it is 
for one’s sense of personhood to be considered legally competent to become a party to an 
                                                 
 43. OKIN, supra note 36, at 122-23. 
 44. Id. at 125. 
 45. ERTMAN, supra note 1. 
 46. Id. at 118. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at xxii. 
 49. Id. at 178-81. 
 50. CAROL GILLIGAN, JOINING THE RESISTANCE 17-18 (2011). 
 51. See also McClain, supra note 39, at 1227-28. 
 52. See ERTMAN, supra note 1, at 136 (invoking partnership law and the idea of business partnership as a 
metaphor to life partnership). 
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enforceable contract; her now classic 1987 article Alchemical Notes discussed the im-
portance of contracts to African Americans, who had been, as slaves, subjects of contracts, 
but never parties to them (and like Love’s Promises, it weaved memoir into the academic 
discussion).53 Jeremy Waldron has made a related point, arguing that formal rights that 
are protected by contract form the basis for human relations, especially for those ostracized 
by society.54 The seemingly alienating formal rights, according to Waldron, have an em-
powering potential for the disenfranchised.55 In the context of the family, Okin argued, in 
her now classic 1989 book, Justice, Gender, and the Family, that women, wives to be more 
precise, needed formal rights within the family; they needed the law to treat their hus-
bands’ obligations as binding and enforceable and not as mere gifts. This will not hinder 
love, but promote and secure equality between husbands and wives, and as a result, equal-
ity between men and women, because their children, who will then grow up in an egalitar-
ian family, will take gender equality, and not inequality, for granted.56 
Love’s Promises thus joins this important lineage of scholarly paradigm-shifting 
works on the importance of contracts for minorities and disenfranchised individuals and 
communities, showing the inherent connection among family law, contract law, and the 
recognition of the full humanity of LGBT persons and other individuals who want to create 
the families of their choice. 
IV. THINKING OF FAMILIES’ LAWS INSTEAD OF FAMILY LAW: THE 
DIFFERENT PACKAGES FAMILIES COME IN 
From Ertman’s book it is clear that current family law offers a one-size-fits all pack-
age of legal tools. Family law has historically developed based on one model, “The Rea-
sonable Family,” and has ignored, or banned, many actual families that were not shaped 
according to this narrow model. I would like to borrow Daphna Hacker’s suggestion to 
shift our discussion from “family law” to “families’ laws.”57 Hacker argues that if we want 
to do justice to all families, we should stop thinking in terms of “the Family” as well as in 
terms of “the Law.”58 
Both Ertman’ and Hacker’s suggestions resonate with psychological, sociological, 
and anthropological research, which has shown that there has never been, throughout hu-
man history, a single model of family, and that what we call now “the nuclear family” 
(thinking of husband, wife, and children who are genetically related to both of them) is a 
relatively new social construct.59 Multiple parents, non-biological parental caregivers, and 
same-sex unions have been with us since the dawn of history. In fact, evolutionary anthro-
pological research has shown that the multiple-parent model, called by Sarah Blaffer Hrdy 
                                                 
 53. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987); see also PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991). 
 54. JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS: 1981-1991 376-77 (1993). 
 55. Id. 
 56. OKIN, supra note 36, at 21. 
 57. DAPHNA HACKER, LEGALIZED FAMILIES IN THE ERA OF BORDERED GLOBALIZATION (forthcoming). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Zvi Triger, Introducing the Political Family: A New Road Map for Critical Family Law, 13 THEORETICAL 
INQ. L. 361, 364 (2012). 
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“alloparenting,” was the dominant parenting model among early hominids.60 The involve-
ment of non-biological parents in the raising of a child was “central to the success of early 
hominids,”61 without which “there never could have been a human species.”62 
Thinking about families’ laws, as stemming from the recognition that “love comes 
in different packages,” should open up the discussion on other types of families, which are 
currently not even recognized as such. In the past I have raised the following dilemma: 
 
In many Western middle- and upper-middle class families, care 
for the young as well as for the elderly is outsourced to paid professional 
caregivers, who are very often labor migrants from less affluent coun-
tries. On the one hand, paid caregivers are employees. On the other hand, 
in many cases they are really companions, or perform very intimate 
chores, which even the care recipients’ relatives do not perform. This 
duality is fascinating: an economic relationship that has the seed of emo-
tional attachment. Should this be taken into consideration when we think 
about families? Most scholarly work on this question has been in labor 
law and has largely not touched upon the shifts that these global trends 
produce in the very definition of the family. Do children raised primarily 
by a non-citizen migrant nanny have a right to a protected relationship 
with her? Does this right trump immigration policies or parental em-
ployment decisions? As families evolve and change in oftentimes un-
predictable directions, sooner or later family law scholars will have to 
address these questions.63 
 
Indeed, families can take many shapes. Family law scholarship has explored some 
dimensions, such as various forms of parenthood and life partnership, but it has yet to look 
into the time dimension: can a family be formed based on a commercial transaction of paid 
care that evolves into a bond of love? And does it matter that such a family has an expira-
tion date (the infant growing up and becoming independent, the elder person passing 
away)? 
Ertman’s introduction of contracts into the traditionally sacred sphere of love can 
help us to think about these and many other dilemmas that will undoubtedly arise as fam-
ilies evolve, and, hopefully, as families’ laws follow suit. 
V.  A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY: THE ROLE OF MEMOIR IN A BOOK 
ABOUT THE LAW 
As I have already mentioned, the book weaves memoir into academic scholarship. 
This methodology, using the author’s personal story, is not new. But I believe that it is 
                                                 
 60. SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, MOTHERS AND OTHERS: THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF MUTUAL 
UNDERSTANDING 109 (2009). 
 61. Id. at 147. 
 62. Id. at 109; see also ERTMAN, supra note 1, at 127 (discussing Blaffer Hrdy’s findings). 
 63. Triger, supra note 59, at 379-80. 
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new to contract scholarship, and it is not common in family law scholarship either (even 
though family law is a great contender for such writing). It not only makes the book highly 
accessible to diverse audiences but also profoundly strengthens its arguments. 
Feminist methodology has always grounded scholarship in the personal life experi-
ences of women.64 Storytelling has been a key element in critical race theory as well.65 
Not surprisingly, this methodology has been attacked for being non-academic, biased, and 
non-objective. But today it seems that the sharp division between valid (remote, imper-
sonal) and invalid (personal, exposed) ways of creating and acquiring knowledge is out-
dated. The personal, which is the political, as we were taught, has a lot to teach us, and 
Love’s Promises joins the formidable lineage of feminist scholarship that melds memoir 
with research in order to create rich, rigorous, and persuasive scholarship. 
Indeed, “the medium is the message:”66 families are made of people. They come in 
many shapes, just as “love comes in different packages.”67 There is no point in an imper-
sonal, detached, and abstract discussion of “the family” and family law, unless we want to 
keep it on a purely theoretical level. The memoir parts of Love’s Promises use “this crazy 
collage of friends, family, and commerce”68 to avoid this abstraction, which may be con-
sidered by some more “academic,” but has nothing to do with reality. 
The overall effect of this methodology, combined with Ertman’s warm, accessible, 
and oftentimes entertaining prose, is to make a highly persuasive argument in favor of 
contracts, Plan A and B families, and a more inclusive vision of families and their mem-
bers. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Love’s Promises is an important contribution to the feminist critique of traditional 
liberal notion of an acrimonious relationship between law and the family and, more spe-
cifically, between contract and family. It joins a recent wave of books critical of current 
family law.69 But Love’s Promises is about contract as much as it is about the family. 
Ertman is a great believer in the role of law, and in particular the role of contract law, in 
promoting meaningful, stable, and egalitarian relationships, as well as in promoting chil-
dren’s best interests. The book explores the role of contracts within the family. It shows 
that contracts shape today’s families, and argues that family law should acknowledge that 
                                                 
 64. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, THE BIRTH OF PLEASURE: A NEW MAP OF LOVE (2003); GILLIGAN, supra 
note 50 (feminist scholarship that is part-memoir part-academic). 
 65. See, e.g., Williams, Alchemal Notes, supra note 53. 
 66. See MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 7 (1964) (borrowing 
the phrase from McLuhan’s book). 
 67. ERTMAN, supra note 1, at 109. 
 68. Id. at 26. 
 69. See, e.g., JUNE CARBONE AND NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE 
AMERICAN FAMILY (2014); JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED (2014); CLAIRE HUNTINGTON, 
FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS (2014); Maxine Eichner, The Family, 
in Context, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1980, 1981-983 (2015) (providing a concise mapping of family law scholarship 
according to decades); MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S 
POLITICAL IDEALS (2010) (arguing that the state should support families so that they can enhance human devel-
opment and thus benefit adults, children, and society in general). 
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and recognize such contracts. Contracts are what enable people to form new families, such 
as Ertman’s own family—comprised of two moms and a dad raising a child. 
The main contribution of this book is the notion that contracts and love should not 
be regarded by law and society as mutually exclusive. Moreover, as Ertman shows, in 
many cases contracts are what enable love and sustain it. The novelty in her book is two-
fold: both in its arguments and in its methodology.  Ertman convincingly weaves her per-
sonal story into the legal argument in order to show how the law should react to and serve 
the interests of actual people. 
Books can sometimes spark social change. In offering solutions, and not just point-
ing out problems, Love’s Promises can certainly be part of such a much needed change in 
both family and contract law. 
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